Resisting Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum: Another Look at CAB v. Hermann (CAB v. Hermann, U.S., 1957) by unknown
NOTES AND COMMENTS
RESISTING ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS
DUCES TECUM: ANOTHER LOOK AT CAB v. HERMANN*
WHETHER objections to an administrative subpoena duces tecum 1 should
be heard at the district court enforcement stage2 is an overlooked
corollary to the substantive question of a subpoena's validity. Although feder-
al agencies usually obtain voluntary compliance with their requests for doc-
uments, 3 compulsory process has long been recognized as essential to their
investigatory functions.4 No agency, however, is authorized to enforce its
own subpoenas by contempt citations.5 Instead, statutory provisions require
that the agency petition a district court for an order forcing compliance.0 An
adversary proceeding, similar to a trial between private litigants, is then
conducted 7 at which the court will either rule on the affected individual's
*CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957), reversing per curiarn 237 F2d 359 (9th Cir.
1956).
1. A subpoena duces tecum is an order "for the production of documentary evidence."
5 Mooaz, FERA. PRAcTlcE ff 45.05[11], at 1716 (2d ed. 1948). A statute may confer
authority to order production of documents without expressly labelling it a subpoena
power. See, e.g., The Trading With the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 415 (1917), as amended,
50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1952). On administrative investigations, see generally I DAVIS.
AnmxsTRATrVn LAW ch. 3 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAviS].
2. For a detailed breakdown of administrative proceedings into "stages," see Note,
71 IARv. L. REV. 1541 (1958).
3. See Hearings on HR. 4572 Before a Subcommittee of the House Comnmnittee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1949) (statement of Mr.
Wilson); U.S. ATmE x-EY GExERAL'S Coatnir ox ADMINs ATE PR ocraun, FINAL
REPoRT 414 (1941) ; cf. 16 C.F.1. § 1.31 (Supp. 1959) (investigatory policy of the FTC).
But cf. Hearings on H.R. 4572, stpra at 2 (letter of Mr. Kingsley).
4. Congress has recognized this need since the creation of the first administrative
agency, the ICC, in 1887. See Interstate Commerce Commission Act § 12, 24 Stat. 383
(1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 12(2)-(3) (1952). See also U.S. Comrissioi. on
ORGANIZATION OF THE ExECuTIvE BRANcH OF THE: GOVERN!mENTr, TAsK FoRcE Raromr
oN LEGAL SER VICES AND PROCEDUERS 174 (1955); Hearings on H.R. 4572, supra note 3,
at 5 (statement of Mr. Keefe).
5. See I DAvis § 3.11, at 213 & n.7.
6. E.g., The Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 722 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 49 (1958); see 8 WiGmoRE, EvIDErcE § 2195, at 41 (Supp. 1957) (collecting
statutes).
In addition to petitions for enforcement, some statutes provide for the institution
of criminal proceedings in cases of refusal to produce evidence. E.g., The Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 Stat 723 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1958); see 1 DAVIS
§ 3.11, 213 n.4 (collecting statutes). These criminal provisions are, however, infrequently
utilized. See 1 DAvIs § 3.11, 212 nl.
7. These proceedings constitute a "case or controversy" within the meaning of the
Constitution, as distinguished from an interlocutory issue arising out of a primarily
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objections or postpone judicial action until review of a subsequent administra-
tive hearing.8 The inevitability of choice between these alternatives has been
obscured, however, until recently, by concentration on the merits of objections
to enforcement.9
During the formative period of administrative regulation, 6tbstantive limita-
tions were placed on agency subpoena powers. 10 Since compulsory process
was held to be a form of search and seizure,' subpoenas were subjected to a
strict fourth amendment test of reasonableness.' 2 Consequently, they could be
issued only after a showing of probable violation of law.'3 Additionally, the
agency had to describe the documents sought with particularity 14 and demon-
strate their relevancy to the specific violation under investigation. 15 Even if
these requirements were met, enforcement could effectively be resisted on lion-
fourth-amendment grounds such as self-incrimination 10 or lack of agency
jurisdiction.1
7
administrative hearing. Thus, the parties may present evidence, witnesses, and oral argu-
ment to whatever extent appears necessary. See ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 489
(1894). The applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in enforcement pro-
ceedings is unclear. See 7 MooRE, FEDERAL PAcTicE II 81.06[l] (2d ed. 19-8).
8. The more complex the area being regulated the more a court, presumably, will feel
that the claim should be subject to primary agency determination. Closely related is the
problem of exhaustion of administrative remedies with its corollary question of whether
the court feels that Congress intended the agency to initially decide the questions at issue,
In this regard, the complexity of the question and the need for agency expertise will be
important factors influencing the court. See Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v, Hirsch, 331 U.S.
752, 767-69 (1947).
9. See, e.g., Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (discussing the self-
incrimination privilege); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)
(discussing probable cause and relevancy); Wagman v. Arnold, 257 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.
1958) (discussing effect of illegal search and seizure).
10. It has been suggested that restrictions resulted, at least in part, from early
judicial hostility to administrative agencies. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 642 (1950). For a contemporary discussion of earlier doctrines and their
development, see Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade
Commission (pts. 1 & 2), 28 COLUM. L. Rlv. 708, 905 (1928).
11. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 71 (1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
622 (1886). This doctrine was subsequently modified in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 202 (1946).
12. See Boyd v. United States, supra note 11.
13. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1936) ; Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407, 419
(1908) ; FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284 Fed. 886 (1922), aff'd per curiam, 267 U.S.
586 (1924).
14. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 77 (1906).
15. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924) ; Hale v. Henkel, suipra
note 14, at 77.
16. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886). Other privileges, such as
attorney-client, husband-wife, and government secret might conceivably be raised. See
generally McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE 151-302 (1954); 8 WIGMOPF, EvIDENcE §§ 2227-2396
(1940, Supp. 1957).
17. See FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 Fed. 936 (D.C. Cir. 1923), reiv'd on other
grounds, 274 U.S. 160 (1927).
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•Restrictions on subpoena validity were subsequently relaxed, as Congress
continued to delegate broad investigatory authority18 and courts grew more
familiar with the administrative process. 19 Thus, an agency need no longer
show a probable violation before issuing a subpoena; the investigation merely
must relate to some congressionally delegated function.20 M~oreover, a juris-
dictional objection will seldom prevail since determination of "coverage" is
not requisite to subpoena enforcement.21 Diminished judicial interference
has not, however, resulted in unlimited agency subpoena power.P For ex-
ample, demanded documents must still relate to the subject matter of an
inquiry within the agency's authority ;2 a less stringent particularity require-
ment still obtains ;24 and the self-incrimination privilege, while reduced in
scope, remains a protection.25 In addition, courts will modify or refuse to
enforce orders so broad as to be unduly burdensome or oppressive.20- But,
18. See, e.g., The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 899-900, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78u (1958) ; The Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1077-78, as amended.
47 U.S.C. §§ 218-20 (1952).
19. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 634 (1950).
20. United States v. Morton Salt Co., m(pra note 19; Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1946); FTC v. Scientific Living, Inc., 150 F.
Supp. 495, 500 (M.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd per curia,,, 254 F2d 598 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 940 (1958).
21. FTC v. Crafts, 355 U.S. 9 (1957), reversing per curiam 244 F.2d 8 2 (9th Cir.
1957); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra note 20, at 214; Endicott
Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1943); NLRB v. Roddy Mfg. Co., 165
F. Supp. 412, 418 (E.D. Tenn. 1958). But see FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 904
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (discussing "coverage" on the merits).
22. In addition to judicial safeguards, agency officials themselves may exercise a
degree of restraint on their use of the subpoena power.
23. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946).
24. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra note 23, at 208 (fourth
amendment guards against indefiniteness); FTC v. Scientific Living, Inc., 150 F. Supp.
495, 500 (M.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 254 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
940 (1958); cf. Application of Certain Chinese Family Benevolent and District Ass'ns,
19 F.R.D. 97 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (grand jury subpoena quashed for lack of specificity).
See also FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 908 (S.D.N.Y 1957) (discussing applicability
of Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), to administrative subpoenas).
25. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
The privilege, however, may not be claimed on behalf of a corporation or its officers
in relation to corporate records. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911);
FTC v. Scientific Living, Inc., supra note 24, at 500. Neither may an unincorporated
labor union or union official claim the protection as to union records. United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694 (1944). Moreover, the privilege is unavailable in connection with public or
quasi-public records and may be eliminated entirely by the use of immunity statutes. See
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) ; 'Meltzer, Required Records, the IMcCarran
Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 637 (1951).
26. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 122 F.2d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 1941):
FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624, 629-30 (N.D. Ill.), afftd, 248 F2d 456 (7th Cir.
1957).
In addition to excessive breadth, oppressiveness may result from a threatened public
disclosure of the information sought. Where such a situation appears, the court may
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even these remaining protections are threatened by apparent curtailment of
the scope of judicial inquiry at the enforcement stage.
Such curtailment may be indicated by CAB v. Hermann,7 where the Civil
Aeronautics Board sought to enforce subpoenas issued in connection with a
Board complaint.2 8 Enforcement was resisted on grounds of burdensomeness
and oppressiveness (compliance would require a search through more than
a million documents),29 of irrelevancy,30 and, under the right to privacy, of
immunity of personal tax returns from inspection.81 The district court first
granted a ten-day continuance on condition that respondent allow the Board
to inspect and copy all requested documents, except tax returns,
2 so that it
could limit its ultimate demand to those which appeared most necessary. 33
This procedure necessarily implied a finding that all other documents were
relevant; the agency was granted access to the very records whose irrelevancy
was alleged. 34 Respondent failed -to comply,"5 however, and at the end of the
continuance the court enforced the subpoenas-including those subject to her
"privacy" claim-without formal hearing on the merits of the objections.3 0
Its order was based solely on a finding that no irrelevancy was apparent on
the face of the subpoenas.3 7 The Ninth Circuit, reversing and remanding,
required both a determination of the relevancy of each document and a ruling
require that the agency treat the information as confidential. See FTC v. Menzies, 145
F. Supp. 164, 171 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
957 (1957).
The Administrative Procedure Act §§ 6(b)-(c), 60 Stat. 240-41 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1005(b)-(c) (1958), also govern agency investigations and the use of compulsory
process. These provisions do not, however, alter the existing case law. Tobin v. Banks
& Rumbaugh, 201 F2d 223 (5th Cir. 1953) ; see Administrative Procedure Act-Legisla-
tive History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 227, 363, 415 (1946). But see id. at
28, 206. See also U.S. CONFERENCE ON ADMINISmTATIVE PROCEDURE CALLED BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON APRIL 29, 1953, REPORT 19 (1955); U.S. CoM-
MISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON
LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 61 (1955); N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, INSTITUTE PRO-
CEEDINGS VOL. 7, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND TEE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AGENCIES 100, 332, 463 (1947).
27. 353 U.S. 322 (1957), reversing per curiam 237 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1956).
28. See Record, pp. 14-60. The district court opinion is unreported.
29. Id. at 72, 109.
30. Id. at 72-73.
31. Id. at 73, 114.
32. 237 F.2d at 361.
33. See id. at 363 ("[The inspection procedure] was extremely fair and . . . would
have permitted the Board to issue subpoenas for the exact documents which they
wished.").
34. But the court would have aided respondent by transferring the burden of search-
ing through records to the Board. See ibid.
35. 353 U.S. at 323.
36. The Board, however, withdrew one subpoena, the nature of which is not revealed.
See 237 F.2d at 361-62.
37. 353 U.S. at 323; 237 F2d at 362 (both quoting district court).
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on respondent's privacy claim.38 Only full review, the court reasoned, would
prevent "rubber stamp" enforcement of administrative subpoenas.3 0
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, reinstated the enforcement
order on the ground that the district court "duly enforced the Board's right
to call for documents relevant to the issues of the Board's complaint."40 Thus,
the Court impliedly affirmed the district court's broad relevancy test---lay-
ing the subpoenas alongside the charges in the Complaint."'  Respondent's
privacy claim was not considered.-" Most important, the district court's re-
fusal to conduct a full adversary proceeding, in which respondent might have
substantiated her claims, was not expressly discussed. The Court noted, how-
ever, that objections might be raised if the agency subsequently sought to
introduce the documents into evidence.43 This offhand approval of the district
court's procedure was unfortunate; it created difficulties in predicting the
opinion's application in future decisions whether to hear objections to ad-
ministrative subpoenas in enforcement proceedings. 44
Hernmann might be interpreted broadly as general approval of summary en-
forcement proceedings in which only a cursory examination of the agency
subpoena would be necessary. Apparent irrelevancy on the face of the order
would prevent enforcement, but the individual would be afforded no further
protection beyond, perhaps, the requirement of particularity and the pro-
hibition against burdensome and oppressive requests.4 0 Other objections, re-
gardless of their validity, could not be raised until the agency sought to intro-
duce the documents into evidence at a subsequent hearing.40 By accelerating
38. Id. at 362-63.
39. Id. at 363 ("Such an action would constitute the Board the final judges of the
materiality and relevancy of each document subpoenaed. It is hornbook law that they have
no such authority or function.").
40. 353 U.S. at 323.
41. 237 F2d at 362. Such a test was justifiable in this case, since the subpoena was
limited by a specific complaint. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
42. Rehearing was sought so that the Court might consider the privacy issue, Respon-
dent's Petition for Rehearing, p. 2, but was denied, 354 U.S. 927 (1957).
43. 353 U.S. at 324.
44. The Court's product has shown an increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic
statement, of the formulation of results accompanied by little or no effort to sup-
port them in reason, in sum, of opinions that do not opine and of per curiam
orders that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between the authorities they
cite and the results they decree.
Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincols Mills
Case, 71 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1957).
45. See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text. In Hernann, the subpoenas, al-
though broad in scope, specifically described the documents sought. See Brief for Re-
spondents, appendix (Summary of Subpoenas). And the district court did not require
the production of all the documents at once-a procedure which the Supreme Court
viewed as easing the burden on respondents. See 353 U.S. at 323.
46. See note 43 supra and accompanying te-t.
This interpretation conflicts with the long-standing "fruit of the poisonous tree" duc-
trine. If respondent objects to the admission of a particular document into evidence on
1959]
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enforcement, administrative efficiency would be increased. This view of Hcr-
mann was suggested by one commentator shortly after the decision appeared.47
But later cases have neither clearly adopted nor explicitly repudiated this
interpretation. Thus courts, notwithstanding Hermann, have considered on
their merits such objections to subpoena enforcement as: invalid issuance ;48
improper subdelegation of authority ;49 arbitrariness or unreasonableness;,"
presubpoena illegal search and seizure;r1 self-incrimination ;52 burdensome-
ness ;53 and irrelevancy of the documents to the investigation. 4 Yet no court
has attempted specifically to limit Hermann's possibly broad implications. In
fact, the case has been used to justify summary disposal of a burdensomeness
claim.5 5 The possibility remains, therefore, that a court confronted with a
Hermann-based plea for summary subpoena enforcement will squarely hold
the ground that it was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, and is sustained,
the agency faces a string of objections to the admissibility of all other evidence obtained
as a result of information in the illegally "seized" document. See Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); 8 WIGMoaoE, EvIDENCE § 2184 (1940, Supp.
1957).
47. Note, 71 HAv. L. Rav. 1541, 1543-44 (1958), arguing that Hermann refuted the
assumption that enforcement requires a full hearing, and speaking of that case as en-
suring "a speedy conclusion of the first stage [enforcement] proceeding by attributing
to the subpoena an irrefutable presumption of relevancy if it is relevant on its face."
The Note suggests that, under Hermann, objections should be postponed until the subse-
quent "agency hearing." Id. at 1544 & n.20. Possible inconsistency of Hermann, broadly
interpreted, with the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, see note 46 supra, is not dealt
with.
Although not willing to abandon completely the concept of a "hearing" at the enforce-
ment stage, other commentators have generally approved restrictions on the individual's
right to be heard, in the belief that these restrictions would increase administrative
efficiency. See Sherwood, The Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas, 44 COLUM. L.
REv. 531, 537-38 (1944) ; Note, 45 Gao. L.J. 683 (1957) ; Note, 14 GEO. WASH. L. Ray,
602, 609-10 (1946); Note, 31 Gao. L.J. 304, 309, 312 (1943); Note, 52 YALE L.J. 175,
180 (1942).
48. See Lewis v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 10 (1958) ; FTC v. Waltham Watch Co., 169 F. Supp.
614, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
FTC v. Scientific Living, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 495, 503 (M.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd per curiam,
254 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 940 (1958).
49. See NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 357 U.S. 1, 7 (1958); FCC v. Cohn, supra
note 48, at 909-11.
50. See FTC v. Scientific Living, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 495, 500 (M.D. Pa. 1957),
aff'd per curiam, 254 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 940 (1958).
51. See Wagman v. Arnold, 257 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1958).
52. Ibid.
53. See FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624, 629 (N.D. Ill.), aft'd, 248 F.2d 456 (7th
Cir. 1957).
54. FTC v. Hallmark, Inc., 265 F2d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 1959); FTC v. Scientific
Living, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 495, 500 (M.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd per curian,, 254 F.2d 598
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 940 (1958).
55. National Plate & Window Glass Co. v. United States, 254 F.2d 92, 93 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822 (1958).
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that the Supreme Court has eliminated the need for full district court con-
sideration of substantive objections.
Courts need not, however, deny individuals a full hearing in order to ac-
commodate Hermann. The only claim explicitly considered in the opinion
was irrelevancy.56 Thus, even if -the case means that the district court should
not hear relevancy objections during subpoena enforcement proceedings, it
might not extend to other claims. Moreover, Hernzann can be limited by its
unique facts. Since the agency's inquiry was limited by a specific prior corn-
plaint, it was reasonable to determine the documents' relevancy, for subpoena
purposes, from the subpoena's face-the test approved in that case.5' So viewed,
Hernann is a holding on the merits of a particular objection, rather than a
ruling that objections should not be considered in enforcement proceedings.
And had examination of particular documents been required, respondent's
failure to comply with the district court's suggested preenforcement inspection
procedure seems to have been held a waiver of this protection.58 Since the
agency was thereby prevented from limiting its subpoena to those documents
itthought most necessary, all the records originally sought remained in issue.5 "
In order to adjudicate respondent's broad claim of irrelevancy, the court would
have been required to examine more than a million documents.(0 The at-
tendant delay and inconvenience of such a procedure also justifies Hcrmann's
summary determination of relevancy. Where, however, the individual's actions
have not made complete examination of documents impractical, courts are
not compelled by Hernian's reference to raising objections at a later time "I
to postpone consideration of objections until future administrative hearings.
Indeed, the Court's "subsequent opportunity" language may be viewed merely
as an attempt to 'ensure that respondent's failure to raise specific claims in
the enforcement proceeding would not bar later objections, of any sort, to
the admission of particular documents into evidence. Hcrmann, therefore,
can have little or no effect on the adjective aspects of enforcement proceedings.
56. See 353 U.S. at 323. Although respondent also raised a privacy claim, see Brief
for Respondents, p. 27, the Court did not mention this argument, perhaps because it was
not based on specific constitutional or legislative provisions, or even a claim of privilege,
see id. at 29.
57. Thus, in post-Hermann subpoena cases not involving specific complaints, courts
have conducted full hearings into relevance claims. See FTC v. Waltham Watch Co., 169
F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (investigation into misleading advertising and other
unfair trade practices) ; FTC v. Scientific Living, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 495 (M.D. Pa. 1957).
aff'd per curiam, 254 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.), cert. detied, 355 U.. 940 (1958) (investigation
into false advertising). But cf. FTC v. Hallmark, Inc., 265 F.2d 433 (7th Cr. 1959)
(subpoena limited by previously issued cease and desist order; full hearing conducted).
58. This inference is drawn from the fact that the Court, in a brief per curiam opinion,
took care to mention respondent's failure to comply with the inspection procedure sug-
gested below. See 353 U.S. at 323.
59. Ibid.
60. See Brief for Respondents, appendix (Summary of Subpoenas), for detailed
listing of the documents involved.
61. See note 43 .supra and accompanying text.
1959]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Narrow interpretation of Hermann accords with legislative intent and judicial
policies against unrestricted agency subpoena power. If district courts conducted
rubber-stamp enforcement proceedings, the agency would, for all practical pur-
poses, have the power-consistently denied by Congress 02 n-to enforce its
own subpoenas. 63 Further, unless individuals are afforded a full hearing where-
in they may raise substantive objections before being forced to surrender
documents, courts can not adequately determine whether agency acquisition
of the documents constitutes an unlawful intrusion into privacy under the
Supreme Court's construction of the fourth amendment. 64 For although a re-
62. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. See also Lilienthal, The Power of
Governmental Agencies To Compel Testimony, 39 HAxv. L. REv. 694, 700-02 (1926).
63. Administrative subpoenas do not subject the witness to punishment for contempt
until the agency has secured enforcement from a District Court after proceedings in
which ... the witness has an opportunity to raise all issues pertinent to a motion
to quash a subpoena alleged to be unreasonable or oppressive.
FTC v. Hallmark, Inc., 265 F2d 433, 437 (7th Cir. 1959) (dictum).
64. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958) (essential purpose of fourth
amendment is to prevent unwarranted intrusions into privacy); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948) (right of privacy a unique value); Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 709 (1948) (fourth amendment protects against unreasonable in-
trusions into privacy); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("When tile
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be deter-
mined by a judicial officer . . ").
The intrusion into privacy is complete upon surrender of documents, regardless of
subsequent opportunities to keep them out of evidence. See NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co.,
357 U.S. 1, 9 (1958) (concurring opinion):
It is obvious that after the illegal or oppressive subpoena has been enforced, the
... [agency] on its review of the completed record can no more relieve the
consummated oppression than it can unring a bell . . . . [T]he ...[agency's]
subpoenas may be enforced only by a United States District Court, and thus an
effective means exists to revoke an illegal or oppressive subpoena duces tecum
before the damage has been done.
Although many of the cases focus on the right to privacy of individuals, the fourth
amendment applies to corporations as well. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (dictum); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264
U.S. 298 (1924). See also FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), referring,
at 904, to "rights of individual businessmen to pursue their legitimate business activities
without being subjected to unnecessary and harassing government inquisition" where the
records sought were corporate. See generally LAssoN, THE HIsToRY AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 137-38 (1937).
A possible relaxation of the fourth amendment's protection of privacy may be indi-
cated by Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), upholding a conviction and fine for
failing to permit a health inspector to enter private premises without a warrant. The
case, however, concerned the fourteenth amendment which was construed as "not re-
stricted" by the "historic bounds" of the fourth. Id. at 366. The "constitutional right to
privacy" was admitted and the Court noted that the case merely interpreted the attempted
search as "reasonable" in the light of the safeguards in the particular statute involved.
Id. at 366-67. Although the dissenting Justices apparently felt the majority was primar-
ily restricting the fourth amendment to criminal cases, see id. at 377, the majority refers
to "entry which has as its design the securing of information to fortify the coercive
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fusal to surrender documents can be punished only after a contempt pro-
ceeding, 5 the validity of the court order cannot usually be attacked at that
time.
66
Even were the fourth amendment satisfied by a "subsequent opportunity"
to object to the admissibility of documents into evidence, the individual would
often be placed in a disadvantageous position. While the final agency rulings
are subject to judicial review, 67 courts have been reluctant to reverse an
agency because of the use of inadmissible evidence.68 In addition, some sub-
power of the state against the individual, information which may be used to effect a
further deprivation of life or liberty or property," id. at 365. These conditions are
present in administrative investigations. And the majority's references to "searches for
evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions," ibid., id. at 372, are made in the context
of an "actual" search and seizure, not the "constructive' search and seizure of a subpoena
duces tecum. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. WkValling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
65. The agency must initiate the contempt proceedings, since the court may punish
summarily only those contempts which occur in its presence. See Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
66. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 69 (1948) ("disobedience cannot be justified by
re-trying the issues as to whether the order should have issued in the first place');
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947) ("We find impressive
authority for the proposition that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by
orderly and proper proceedings .... This is true without regard even for the constitu-
tionality of the Act under which the order is issued."); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181,
189 (1922); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir. 1957); Land v. Dollar, 190
F.2d 366, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Clarke v. FTC, 128 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1942) (court
order is reviewable only on direct appeal and may not be collaterally attacked upon
appeal from order adjudging party in contempt for disobedience) ; see Moonr, CumE..n-
TARY ON THE U.S. JUDIcIAL CODE 502 (1949); Murphy, The Contempt Power of the
Federal Courts, 18 FED. B.J. 34, 41 (1958); cJ. United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179,
183 n.4 (1956). But see Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951);
Note, 71 HAnv. L. REV. 1541, 1545 (1958) ("[T]he respondent must now disobey the
subpoena to obtain a hearing on the merits as to the validity of the subpoena. Under the
Hermam doctrine, those issues not open to contest at the first [enforcement] stage may
be raised at the second [contempt] stage.").
All defenses are not precluded, however. For example, inability to comply with the
court order is a complete defense, absent a showing of bad faith. United States v. Bryan,
339 U.S. 323 (1950).
67. See Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009
(1958). Compare Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943),
with Leedum v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
68. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 497 (1951) ; FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948); Marmon v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 21S F2d
716 (3d Cir. 1955); American Rubber Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 214 F2d 47 (7th Cir.
1954); Scanlon, Judicial Review Under the Admidistrative Procedure Act-In Which
Judicial Offspring Receive a Congressional Confirmation, 23 Nora- DAMz L.W,. 501, 537
(1948); Hearings on S. 674, S. 675 and S. 918 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1353-1359 (1941) ; Stason, "Substantial
Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1026 (1941). See also Administra-
tive Procedure Act §§ 7(c), 10(e), 60 Stat. 241, 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 100((c),
1009(e) (1958) ; 2 DAvis § 14.08, at 282. But see NLRB v. Haddock-lnigine trs, Ltd.,
215 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1954).
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poenas are issued pursuant to a broad investigation, rather than a specific
Complaint, and not all investigations culminate in adjudications. 0 Some indi-
viduals will, therefore, never have a "subsequent opportunity." Even if an
agency hearing is eventually held, not all individuals who have been required
to produce documents will become parties.70 They too will probably lose all
opportunity to object to the investigative action.71 Thus, for both constitutional
and practical reasons, Hermann must be narrowly construed.
In contrast, a broad interpretation of Hermann would only increase the
speed of administrative enforcement at the expense of individual protection.
Still, a full enforcement proceeding can increase administrative efficiency. If
a hearing and final order follow the investigation, courts may reverse the
agency if the order is unsupportable without evidence obtained via an invalid
subpoena.72 Had the subpoena been challenged before enforcement, the agency
would have been spared the expense and delay of a useless hearing.
To minimize possibilities of delay, a requirement that objections to enforce-
ment be raised with specificity should be imposed. Under such a requirement,
when, as in Hermann, objections are stated so broadly that they cannot be
assessed without judicial examination of countless documents, the court would
not give them a full hearing.73 If, however, an individual objects to the pro-
duction of a particular document, courts would make a determination on the
merits. In this manner, the agency will be freed from the delay occasioned
by broadly framed objections,74 while the individual will be enabled fully to
enjoy his substantive protections.
69. See 1 DAvis § 3.02, at 165.
70. See generally 1 DAvis § 8.11; GEoLHORN & BYSE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CAsES
833-58 (1954).
71. A nonparty is not entitled to notice of a hearing. NLRB v. Pennsylvania Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938). If a nonparty desires to be heard, he may petition
the agency for permission to intervene. But, "since the vast majority of statutes are
silent on the question, there generally is no privilege to intervene unless the agency has
given it by prescribing rules governing the matter." GELLoRN & BYSE, op. cit. .supra
note 70, at 843; see Seaboard & Western Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950).
72. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). See also note 68
supra (emphasizing the requirement that the agency finding must be supported by other
substantial evidence in order to overcome the effect of improper admission of some
evidence).
73. In such a case, the court would be required only to determine the merits of
claims raised in the most convenient alternative manner. Usually, this would entail only
an examination of the agency subpoena. See text at note 57 supra.
74. In order to protect against spurious claims, made only for reasons of delay, a
statutory provision allowing the court to assess monetary penalties against the delaying
party might be enacted. See ASSOCIAT7ON OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION PRAC-
TITIONERS, COMPARISON OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr AND AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION PROPOSED CODE OF FEDERAL ADMINISRATIVE PROCEDURE § 1009(g), at 13
(1957).
